RSD555 skrev:Jag hade tänkt att den här tråden skulle handla om theory of mind och vad ni här anser om ToM som generell bakomliggande förklaring till autismspektrum.
För mig är det en dålig förklaring men vet inte om den är felaktig eller om det är jag som inte förstår den.
Jag har väldigt dålig koll på hur sånt jag säger och skriver kommer att uppfattas. Jag har svårigheter att göra mig förstådd.
Jag ska förtydliga teorin för dig. Därefter förklara hur vi med Asperger fungerar.
Allmänt om Theory of MindTheory of mind (often abbreviated ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself, and to others, and to understand that others have beliefs, desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from one's own. Deficits can occur in people with autism spectrum disorders, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, cocaine addiction,and brain damage suffered from alcohol's neurotoxicity. Although philosophical approaches to this exist, the theory of mind as such is distinct from the philosophy of mind.
Theory of mind är alltså en teori om hur vi förstår omvärlden. Det är uppenbart att vi (med AS) förstår världen på ett annat sätt.
Definition ToMTheory of mind is a theory insofar as the mind is the only thing being directly observed. The presumption that others have a mind is termed a theory of mind because each human can only intuit the existence of their own mind through introspection, and no one has direct access to the mind of another.
Teorin förutsätter att vi inte har tillgång till andras medvetanden. Vi kan enbart göra antaganden om andra från våra egna medvetanden (intellektuellt och emotionellt)
It is typically assumed that others have minds analogous to one's own, and this assumption is based on the reciprocal, social interaction, as observed in joint attention, the functional use of language, and the understanding of others' emotions and actions.
En allmän föresats att andras medvetanden liknar varandra utgår från ömsesidig socialt samspel och iakttagande, språkets funktion, förståelsen av varandras gärningar och känslor
Having theory of mind allows one to attribute thoughts, desires, and intentions to others, to predict or explain their actions, and to posit their intentions.
I egenskap av att ha en ToM kan man förstå andras begär, avsikter och göra antaganden eller förklara andras ageranden och förutsätta andras avsikter
Innebörd ToMToM är en teori som utgår från att vi är alla självständiga individer. Fast vi uppfattar världen likadant, då vi gemensamt och ömsesidigt upplever världen genom utbyte av känslor och förståelse av språkets funktion, kan vi sätta oss in andra människors situation genom teoretiska antaganden.
Om vi känslomässigt har delat ungefärliga upplevelser med den personen som vi observerar kan vi ha god förståelse för hur personen upplever situationen, eftersom vi har varit i en snarlik situation.
Om vi intellektuellt förstår språkets funktion kan vi förmedla information genom detta och andra förstår informationen eftersom de har tolkat och förstått språket på samma sätt.
ToM kan sammanfattas som att vi förenas med andra på grund av att vi alla uppfattar och upplever faktiska saker i (den verkliga) världen ungefär på samma sätt. Om flertal individer förstår och tolkar världen på samma sätt, emotionellt och intellektuellt, har de en gemensam ToM. De behöver inte ständigt göra teoretiska antaganden utan förstår detta per automatik. Jämför med texten nedanför som är en slutsats baserad på premisserna i definitionen.
Theory of mind appears to be an innate potential ability in primates including humans, that requires social and other experience over many years for its full development. Different people may develop more, or less, effective theory of mind. Empathy is a related concept, meaning the recognition and understanding of the states of mind of others, including their beliefs, desires and particularly emotions.
Aspergers och ToMMany individuals classified as autistic have severe difficulty assigning mental states to others, and they seem to lack theory of mind capabilities. Researchers who study the relationship between autism and theory of mind attempt to explain the connection in a variety of ways. One account assumes that theory of mind plays a role in the attribution of mental states to others and in childhood pretend play. According to Leslie, theory of mind is the capacity to mentally represent thoughts, beliefs, and desires, regardless of whether or not the circumstances involved are real. This might explain why some autistic individuals show extreme deficits in both theory of mind and pretend play. However, Hobson proposes a social-affective justification, which suggests that with an autistic person, deficits in theory of mind result from a distortion in understanding and responding to emotions. He suggests that typically developing human beings, unlike autistic individuals, are born with a set of skills (such as social referencing ability) that later lets them comprehend and react to other people's feelings. Other scholars emphasize that autism involves a specific developmental delay, so that autistic children vary in their deficiencies, because they experience difficulty in different stages of growth.
It has been speculated that ToM exists on a continuum as opposed to the traditional view of a discrete presence or absence. While some research has suggested that some autistic populations are unable to attribute mental states to others, recent evidence points to the possibility of coping mechanisms that facilitate a spectrum of mindful behavior. Tine et al. suggest that autistic children score substantially lower on measures of social theory of mind in comparison to children diagnosed with Asperger syndrome.
Vad som följer av ovan är att ToM kan förstås på olika sätt, anledningen till varför de med AS har en avvikande ToM förblir oklart. Dessutom lär orsaken varför de med AS uppfattar världen annorlunda och inte besitter ToM förbli oklar eftersom de faktiskt berör det mest grundläggande om hur världen är beskaffad och hur vi lär oss att förstå den. För vidare information om detta kan jag enbart hänvisa dig till filosofi.
4.1. The ‘Theory of Mind’ Account
In the 1980s interest swung from investigations of language, perception and memory, to explorations of the social impairments in autism. The task for psychological theories became to explain the concurrence of imagination, communication, and socialization impairments. Perhaps the most influential of these attempts has been the ‘theory of mind’ deficit account; the hypothesis that people with autism are unable to represent the mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires) of themselves and others, and to understand and predict behavior in terms of these states. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith in 1985 proposed such a deficit on the basis of failure on a simple test of theory of mind, or ‘mentalizing’; children with autism, unlike normal 4-year-olds or children with Down's syndrome, were unable to predict where a character would look for an object moved in their absence. Instead of taking into account the character's mistaken belief about the object's location, the children with autism answered on the basis of the real state of affairs (see Frith 1989). This failure to attribute mental states independent of reality and of the child's own belief, has now been replicated in a number of studies. Importantly, children and adults with autism succeed on closely matched tasks not requiring theory of mind (see Happé 1995).
The notion of a deficit in mentalizing seems to account well for the triad of impairments. Children with autism lack insightful social reciprocity, but often like company and physical contact. A person with autism may transmit a message accurately, verbatim, but fail to recognize who does and does not already possess the information. Pretend play, in which real and imagined states are contrasted, is strikingly absent in autism, but physical play is seen. A theory of mind deficit thus accounts for the core features of autism, while allowing intact skills in other areas. Whether the mentalizing deficit is itself the result of impairments in earlier social processes (e.g., emotional interaction, imitation, sharing attention), is as yet unclear (see Baron-Cohen et al. 1993).
To date, a delay in theory of mind development appears to be a universal feature of autism. A minority, especially those with Asperger's syndrome, do develop some understanding of other minds in adolescence, perhaps using their general intelligence to puzzle out what others' think and feel. There is considerable interest in trying to teach theory of mind to children with autism, although to date generalization of these taught skills has been limited. However, the use of concrete props and supports, such as cartoon strips and thought bubbles, appears to be effective in helping some children develop greater social understanding (see Howlin 1998).
Theory of Mind: Emotionella avvikelser hos AS mot NTAbstractIt is generally thought that individuals with Asperger's syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals' Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to problems with emotion regulation
One of the key deficits in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome
and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) is thought to center around
impairments in their cognitive and affective Theory of Mind and
related perspective taking processes (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer,
Berger, Goldsher, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). In particular, individuals
with AS/HFA often show an impaired comprehension of other
people’s mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, and intentions
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith & Happe´, 1994). These deficiencies
in Theory of Mind previously have been linked to deficits in
social communication such as diminished facial expressivity, low
levels of joint attention, and diminished sharing of emotions
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin,
& Clubley, 2001). We propose that deficits in Theory of Mind
also may help to explain clinical and initial empirical reports that
individuals with AS/HFA have difficulties regulating their emotions
(e.g., Laurent & Rubin, 2004; Rieffe et al., 2011)
Theory of Mind and Affective Functioning:
Theoretical Expectations
Although Theory of Mind is typically seen as referring to the
ability to assess other people’s mental states, there is strong evidence
that the processes of assessing one’s own and other’s mental
states are closely related (Frith, 1989; Frith & Frith, 2003). This
suggests that Theory of Mind deficits might also lead to difficulties
assessing one’s own mental states (e.g., Moriguchi et al., 2006). It
is important to note that this may not only hold for cognitive states,
but also for emotional states. If this is correct, Theory of Mind
deficits should be related to difficulties reading and labeling one’s
own emotions, as well as those of other people. If AS/HFA
children express little emotion (e.g., Yirmiya, Kasari, Sigman, &
Mundy, 1989) these difficulties might be exacerbated by the fact
that caretakers of these children would have difficulty mirroring
their children’s emotions and teaching them adequate emotional
responses.
What implications might such deficits have for emotion regulation?
It has been suggested that the ability to accurately label
one’s emotional states is an important prerequisite for successful
emotion regulation (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & Benvenuto, 2001).
This observation generates the prediction that individuals with
AS/HFA might have difficulties with emotion regulation. In particular,
Theory of Mind deficits might compromise emotion regulation
strategies that rely on cognitive processes related to perspective
change. One example of such a cognitive emotion
regulation process is reappraisal, an adaptive emotion regulation
strategy that is strongly related to cognitive change (Gross & John,
2003). This line of reasoning suggests that individuals with AS/
HFA would be less likely to use reappraisal than typically developing
(TD) individuals.
Emotion Experience, Labeling, and Regulation:
Empirical Findings
Consistent with these expectations, prior research indicates that
the emotional responses of individuals with AS/HFA are less
differentiated, more negative, and less positive than those of controls
(e.g., Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, &
Sigman, 1993; Joseph & Tager-Flusber, 1997; Kasari & Sigman,
1997; Samson, Huber, & Ruch, 2011a). In addition, individuals
with AS/HFA experience significant difficulties adequately assessing
and labeling their own emotions (i.e., alexithymia; see Berthoz
& Hill, 2005; Fitzgerald & Bellgrove, 2006; Fitzgerald & Molyneux,
2004; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Szatmari et al., 2008;
Tani et al., 2004).
Recent studies have also provided initial evidence for emotion
regulation deficits among AS/HFA populations. For example,
Konstantareas and Stewart (2006) showed that children diagnosed
with ASD employ fewer adaptive coping strategies in mildly
frustrating situations. Immature patterns of behavior that might be
related to emotion regulation, such as chewing on clothing or
carrying around unusual objects, have also been observed among
AS/HFA individuals (Geller, 2005; Laurent & Rubin, 2004;
Myles, 2003; Volkmar & Klin, 2003). However, so far no study
has focused on specific, well-defined emotion regulation strategies
such as reappraisal and suppression.
Concluding Comment
Although emotional problems are not usually seen as part of the
core features of ASD, recent findings have shown that there is an
overlap between core diagnostic features and emotional/behavioral
problems in ASD (Georgiades et al., 2011). Our study helps us to
better characterize emotional difficulties in AS/HFA that we suggest
may flow from deficits in Theory of Mind and perspective
taking. Our results show that emotion regulation difficulties, most
pronounced in reappraisal, cannot be explained by differences in
the emotion experience or emotion labeling. Moreover, difficulties
in reappraisal, one of the most adaptive emotion regulation strategies,
might be specifically associated with deficits in perspective
taking abilities related to Theory of Mind. However, further research is needed to better understand emotion regulation in AS/HFA and its links to core symptoms of the disorder.
Källor: https://everipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind/#top International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
2001, Pages 987–991
BRIEF REPORT
Emotion Regulation in Asperger’s Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism
Andrea C. Samson
Stanford University
Oswald Huber
University of Fribourg
James J. Gross
Stanford University, Emotion, 2012, Vol. 12, No. 4, 659 – 665